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 This study examines an overarching research question: to what extent do 
military leaders’ personalities and command relations affect strategy and 
operations? The method used for this study is a single-case qualitative case study 
applied to an historical exemplar of the relationship between Generals Eisenhower and 
Spaatz during the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO) for the purpose of initial 
development of theory for General Officer (GO) professional interpersonal conduct. The 
reason for choosing this particular case is that this relationship occurred amidst one of the 
most turbulent strategic times for GOs and fostered a great deal of cooperation amongst a 
large group of GOs. The case study hypotheses were disproved as strategic decisions 
were made from an analytic standpoint and not borne out of personality conflicts or blind 
spots due to personal schema. It is concluded that the conduct of GOs can radically alter 
strategy and it is of utmost importance that officers conduct themselves in a manner 
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 History has long examined the Generals from within its annals; Generals are the 
face and the exemplar of their armies. When examining these individuals, we often look 
to their personalities and how they led their forces – but rarely are their communications 
with other General Officers (GOs), or Flag Officers, to accomplish a broader strategy 
examined for lessons learned. When history does look at these interactions it is often to 
underscore a sense of drama and urgency in the historical narrative or to highlight a 
blunder of some sort – be it an intelligence failure, strategic blunder, or even outright 
failure. A paramount facet of these discussions should synthesize the discussion of 
individual generals into an academic discussion of the strategic communications between 
generals and how that ultimately affects the operations at hand. 
 How does the interaction between GOs affect operations? How much does a 
military organization reflect the personality of its leader? How easily can a viable 
strategy be overlooked by a blind spot in the strategic vision of a superior commander? 
This study attempts to examine the foundational issue from these questions by studying 
the interactions of GOs and how the personal aspects of leaders in the positions of Flag 
Officers can change the course of Theater-wide strategy. The scope of this study is 
designed to be a catalyst to bring the discussion of GO conduct into the academic sphere. 
 This study will focus primarily on the relationship between Generals Eisenhower 
and Spaatz during the latter half of World War II in Europe; this was a pivotal time for 
the Allied forces with the air war against the Luftwaffe at a peak and preparations for 
Operation OVERLORD – the crux of Allied strategy to break the Reich. General Spaatz 
provided General Eisenhower with a plan, several times, to target the German oil supply 
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in order to ultimately bring the German war machine to a screeching halt; Eisenhower 
chose not to use that plan, but why?  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Amongst the literature of military leadership, much of it is focused on the concept 
of fostering personal leadership skills, identifying personality traits of leaders, and 
potential predictors of effective leaders. While this literature is highly applicable to 
military training of junior officers, there is little to extrapolate to Flag Officers who have, 
typically, at least 20 years in the service and plenty of those years in command positions. 
There are resources within the branches of service geared toward teaching 
commanders how to interact with each other and their superiors (i.e. the Air Force hosts 
Squadron Commanders’ Courses for newly appointed officers for taking command of a 
unit) yet those resources do not make their way into the larger sphere of academia. If 
those materials are made available for research, they are largely white papers published 
from a branch’s post-graduate institution (i.e. the Army War College in Carlyle, PA or 
the Air Force Air University in Maxwell AFB, AL) written by Field Grade Officers 
(FGOs; these are officers in the grades of O-4 through O-6). Aside from those internal 
resources, the military resources available for leadership conduct are from the first half of 
the 20th century and are virtually archaic for application to the modern military.  
Another aspect is that, while there are numerous volumes written about Generals 
and their campaigns, these biographies have not resulted in any significant academic 
discussion of how GOs should communicate and how their inter-command relationships 
can impact operations. Therefore, the literature examined in this study is designed to 
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create a modern framework for a discussion of GO interaction and understanding their 
impact on operations by utilizing the military literature encouraging personal leadership 
skill development and juxtaposing that with material from the business world regarding 
communications from and conduct of corporate executives. The rational for the fusion 
stems from the idea that, within the construct of military culture, GOs are essentially 
executive officers that have upper management positions and are responsible for fostering 
beneficial organizational climates and both generation of and overseeing execution of 
broad strategy for the organization. While it will take some extrapolation across 
corporate/military cultures, the concept of executive communications can translate into 
the military cultural construct. 
 
Military Leadership 
 The Psychology of Military Leadership written by L.A. Pennington, Lt Col (Ret) 
Romeyn Hough Jr., and H.W. Case was published in 1943 and it does discuss the conduct 
of a leader. The title seems misleading as it does not delve into psychological theory; 
rather, this text was absolutely written and directed toward junior officers in order to give 
better insight into what it takes to be a leader in the military and the mindset that comes 
along with it. However, Pennington et al. do make a point that directly relates to the idea 
behind this study. Their comment regarding tact should be maintained at any level of 
leadership – especially at the highest echelons. They state in Chapter 5 that tact 
“…should be possessed in a high degree by the military leader. It can be cultivated1.” 
 
1 Pennington, L. E., Romeyn Beck Hough, and H. W. Case. 1943. The Psychology of Military Leadership. 




Distilling the point, interpersonal skills and the ability to converse diplomatically can 
alleviate even the potential strains of a reprimand. 
 Pennington et al. are not alone in the discussion of personality traits of leaders. 
Judith L. Johnson and William R. Hill of Regent University produced a study in 2009 
titled Personality Traits and Military Leadership wherein they wanted to identify 
personality traits of effective and ineffective military leaders. They did this by polling 
officers in the Army National Guard and asking them to rate leaders in the NEO-PI-R 
scale – a standard personality trait matrix2. According to one of their conclusions (below) 
the more effective officers are more team oriented. 
 The more effective officers were also viewed as more trusting, 
straightforward, and altruistic (facets of Agreeableness) than the ineffective 
leader. It is of interest to note that effective officers are viewed as “high” with 
regard to many facets of Agreeableness, but not “very high” except in the facet of 
Agreeableness known as compliance. This suggests that military leaders viewed 
as effective are more likely to defer to others and to cooperate rather than 
compete3. [Emphasis added]  
 
Bartone, Snook, and Tremble Jr. in their study, Cognitive and Personality 
Predictors of Leader Performance in West Point Cadets, utilized internal measures from 
West Point used to measure leadership potential in cadets to develop predictors of 
successful leaders as both upperclassmen at West Point but also as fully commissioned 
Officers in the Army post-graduation. One of their most prominent findings was related 
to what they called Social Judgement, defined as, “…“discretionary problem solving in 
 
2 Johnson, Judith L. and William R. Hill. 2009. "Personality Traits and Military Leadership." Individual 
Differences Research 7 (1): 1-13. 
 
3 Johnson, Judith L. and William R. Hill. 2009. "Personality Traits and Military Leadership." Individual 
Differences Research 7 (1): 1-13. 
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ill-defined social domains” (p. 25). Here, the ability to exercise sound judgment in regard 
to self, social, and organizational relations is central to effective leadership4.” 
A result of their study was that social judgment was “a significant independent 
predictor of leader performance” and that, while important for junior officers to learn, 
“social judgment skills become even more important as leaders move up the 
organizational hierarchy and must manage increasingly complex and ambiguous 
problems that involve people. Such would seem to be the case in a large people-based 
organization like the U.S. Army5.” More concisely, the ability to handle social situations 
is a paramount skill for an effective leader. Their results also seem to fall in congruity 
with the claims of Pennington et al. mentioned above. 
While The Psychology of Military Leadership was published in the middle of 
World War II, the truths that come out in the text still ring true today; however, the whole 
book is not so relatable to all levels. Much of this text is directed to the new officer who 
is learning the ways and culture of the military. Despite that, there are a couple points that 
are made, and the following principles do even appear to relate well to the suggestion 
from Johnson and Hill with some slight exception: 
8. Never go over the head of the immediately superior officer. It 
sometimes may be very hard on a young officer when, for example, an adjutant 
issues an order that the officer does not believe is right and for the good of the 
service. He may be tempted to appeal to the commanding officer. This should 
never be done until the matter has been discussed with the adjutant and until his 
permission has been secured to consider the question with the commanding 
officer. 
9. Be tolerant of superiors' shortcomings and foibles. No one is perfect. At 
times, senior officers may, for instance, appear to be short-tempered. This may be 
true for several reasons. It may be the burden of responsibility that they are 
 
4 Bartone, Paul T., Scott A. Snook, and Trueman R. Tremble. 2002. "Cognitive and Personality Predictors 





carrying, the strain of prolonged effort, or merely " the privileged irascibility of 
senior officers." In any case, a grudge should not be carried and no words of 
resentment should be spoken6. 
 
 While the first principle boils down to the idea of using the chain of command, it 
does play into the ideas of how leaders should interact. This idea, while imperative for 
junior officers to learn and take to heart, should not take exception to GOs. No matter 
how high in rank a leader may be, there is no need to jump the chain of command until 
absolutely necessary. The second point made by Pennington et al., however, can very 
easily be misconstrued into allowing leaders to be crass with subordinates just because of 
their position. I do not believe this is the intent of the passage, but rather to highlight that 
upper leaders are under egregious amounts of stress and could unduly snap at a 
subordinate. A major factor for the relevance of this statement lies in the examination of 
communications between GOs. If GOs are under large amounts of stress, an officer like 
General Eisenhower, one of only few five-star Generals, would face pressures from his 
subordinate Generals as well as the War Department and the U.S. President. From that 
point of view, it is important to discern if any crassness present in communications 
stemmed from actual disdain or merely a bad day. 
 While discussing assessments of five-star Generals, Theodore and Donna Kinni 
authored No Substitute for Victory: Lessons in Strategy and Leadership from General 
Douglas MacArthur. One of the more salient points made in their examination of General 
MacArthur was his appreciation of innovation and those of his commanders who strove 
to find new and better ways of accomplishing the mission. The following excerpt 
highlights how MacArthur sought to utilize new technologies in the air domain as air 
 
6 Pennington, L. E., Romeyn Beck Hough, and H. W. Case. 1943. The Psychology of Military Leadership. 
New York: Prentice-Hall. 
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combat came into its own during the 1940s. “Rapid innovation in air force methods and 
equipment enabled the highly successful “hit 'em where they ain't” strategy. Air 
commander George Kenney became a favorite of MacArthur because of his willingness 
to innovate7.” 
 While this text does not get into direct communications, it does discuss the fact 
that General MacArthur favored General Kenney for innovating, and he paid attention to 
when his subordinates had ideas that may depart from his own preconceived notions. An 
important facet of leadership, MacArthur was able to see past his own experiences to 
accept others.  
Dr. Paul Lieber enters this discussion in his paper, Rethinking Special Operations 
Leadership: Process, Persuasion, Pre-Existing, and Personality. He defines a personal 
viewpoint, or schema, as:  
“…pre-existing notions that combine for an individual’s perceptions on 
the world around [him/her,] Schema formation, in theory, is a fairly 
straightforward concept. Individuals combine life experiences—for better or 
worse—to create schemata of the world around them. These schemata serve as 
pre-existing frames for which all future messaging/behaviors will find a home8.” 
 
 Understandably, the concept of schemata is important to comprehending how 
GOs react and respond to the rigors of leadership, but these texts still do not build 
directly into a discussion of how GOs, both superior and subordinate Generals, interact 
and what the impacts are on operations. As such, these texts will prove to be a foundation 
 
7 Kinni, Theodore and Donna Kinni. 2005. No Substitute for Victory: Lessons in Strategy and Leadership 
from General Douglas MacArthur. 1st ed. Concordville, Pa.: Pearson Education Inc. 
 
8 Lieber, Paul S. 2016. Rethinking Special Operations Leadership. MacDill AFB, FL: Joint Special 




of basic conduct of an officer and a General that will frame this studies discussion of GOs 
communications and conduct. 
 Still amongst the discussion of characteristics of effective military leaders, Lieber 
does discuss the personality of leaders by claiming that successful leaders will typically 
display extroverted tendencies and are naturally predisposed to utilizing communications 
for problem solving9. His claim falls in line with the previously mentioned findings of 
Johnson and Hill. From this, it appears there is some agreement on the demeanor of 
effective leaders. The literature suggests a profile of an effective leader as demonstrating 
extroverted tendencies, establishing open communication within the organization, 
remaining open to new ideas, and keeping a team-oriented mindset. 
 One text that echoes the sentiment of open communication is Generalship: Its 
Diseases and Their Cure by Major General J.F.C. Fuller. Maj Gen Fuller was a British 
commander and his publication was released in 1933. His examples are largely founded 
in the 18th and 19th centuries – many from Napoleon, various British conflicts, and the 
American Civil War. His discussion of personal conduct may still be relevant today, but 
it is not within the scope of the study as he does not discuss much about GOs interacting. 
His examples come from the ‘old world’ where Generals were few and their command 
was far more absolute. In that respect, his writings are not exactly the most relevant today 
but there are still kernels of truth in his text. He discusses that communication of a 
General is imperative to build a proper will to fight within the force and that, “…without 
the contact of the commander with his men, whether of subordinate commander or of the 
general-in-chief, such enthusiasm cannot be roused and such heroism cannot be 
 
9 Lieber, Paul S. 2016. Rethinking Special Operations Leadership. MacDill AFB, FL: Joint Special 
Operations University, Center for Special Operations Studies and Research, JSOU Press. 
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created10.” When Maj Gen Fuller mentions “enthusiasm” and “heroism” he speaks from a 
pre-World War II idea that war should be glorious and is a place for men to display 
heroism and honor. In that regard, his ideas are far antiquated to modern day’s 
understanding that war is brutal and hellish. Yet, where his text is antiquated in that 
regard, Maj Gen Fuller does discuss – however briefly – the fact that Generals should 
maintain contact and communication with both subordinate commanders and superior 
commanders.  
 
 Political Leadership 
 While the number of texts discussing political leadership is vast, the text that 
proved the most relevant to this study was Leaders in Conflict by Stephen Dyson. His 
book discusses the relationship of President George W. Bush and his Secretary of 
Defense (SECDEF) Donald Rumsfeld during the conflict in Iraq. The reason for the 
inclusion of this text is the relationship between the President and the SECDEF is similar 
to the one used in the study between General Eisenhower (a five-star) and General Spaatz 
(a three-star and later a four-star); both groups display relations between a high-level 
superior and subordinate commander and the subsequent impact of their relationship on 
operations.  
 In his book, Dyson tells the history of Bush’s administration regarding Iraq. Bush 
and Rumsfeld were very different individuals and their personalities clashed too much to 
 
10 Fuller, J. F. C. 1878-1966. 1933. Generalship, its Diseases and their Cure; a Study of the Personal 




make operations effective. Ultimately, Bush fired Rumsfeld as SECDEF and ordered the 
surge into Iraq. Playing into the ideas from Dr. Lieber as discussed earlier, Dyson makes 
the statement: 
[L]eadership itself matters. The choice for war, and the course of post-
Saddam Iraq, was shaped by the worldviews and administrative styles of the US 
president and the secretary of [defense]. Other individuals occupying these roles, 
faced with the same situations, would have made different choices. Individuals 
shaped the history of the war11.  
 
This claim serves to echo Lieber’s schema and the fact that personalities of leaders do 
matter to operations. Operations and organizations are not personality-agnostic, in that 
decisions will be made certain ways regardless of who is in command, but rather are 
more intertwined with the personality and conduct of its leader. Dyson goes on to state, 
“It is the interaction between a leader’s style and their circumstances that holds the key to 
success, however. Leadership is only part of the equation producing policy, and it follows 
then that the key driver of success is not the leader’s style considered in isolation but 
rather the fit between leader and circumstance12.” This brings up another facet to the 
discussion: not only are the leaders important but the circumstances they find themselves 
in matter as well. 
 
 Business Leadership 
 The aspect of business leadership does not initially seem to blend with the unique 
characteristics of military culture at a superficial level, but when dwelt upon critically, a 
 
11 Dyson, Stephen Benedict. 2014. Leaders in Conflict. 1. publ. ed. Manchester [u.a.]: Manchester Univ. 
Press. 
 




business executive has very similar responsibilities as Generals. Executives are the heads 
of their organizations and, as such, drive the culture, communication habits, and direction 
of the organization. Examining the broader discussion of CEO interactions and 
communication can be extrapolated into the culture of the military with some light 
translation. 
 Firstly, like with military leadership, there are studies done to determine 
personality traits of executives and, in a study conducted by Palaiou and Furnham, they 
ask the question in their title: Are Bosses Unique? Personality Facet Differences Between 
CEOs and Staff In Five Work Sectors. They posit that bosses will score differently than 
non-executive employees in a Five Factor Method (FFM) personality test. Their methods 
were quantitative in nature, so they naturally lack the rich, personality-driven data from 
personal interviews, but their research does help in identifying basic personality traits to 
better understand what makes a successful CEO. Similar to some of the military 
predictors and examinations, Palaiou and Furnham did confirm their hypotheses that 
demonstrated CEOs scored higher on extraversion and assertiveness; a conclusion being 
that, at that tier of leadership, it is expected that extroversion is needed to better engage 
with the organization’s employees13. Their conclusion serves to support other claims by 
those engaged in the discussion of military leadership. 
 Oreg and Berson go into the next stage of business leadership: they examine the 
impact a CEO has on an organization and how the executive has influence over the 
command decisions for a business. Their study The Impact of Top Leaders’ 
 
13 Palaiou, Kat and Adrian Furnham. 2014. "Are Bosses Unique? Personality Facet Differences between 
CEOs and Staff in Five Work Sectors." Consulting Psychology Journal: Practice and Research 66 (3): 




Personalities: The Processes Through Which Organizations Become Reflections of Their 
Leaders looks at a similar theory mentioned by Jeffery Thomas in his doctoral 
dissertation about the Attraction-Selection-Attrition (ASA) theory,  
[Proposed] by Schneider (1987)…[the theory] states that the individuals 
that make up an organization are similar in that they were attracted to, selected by, 
and are retained or choose to stay in an organization. Therefore, there is likely to 
be homogeneity of personality traits within the Army. Further, ASA suggests that 
the degree to which the individual “fits” in the organization depends on how well 
his or her personality fits with the modal personality of the organization 
(Schneider, Smith, Taylor, & Fleenor, 1998)14. 
 
Oreg and Berson put this concept to the test and display a chart outlining the flow of how 
a leader’s personality impacts operations. By this figure, Oreg and Berson posit that a 
leaders’ personality traits and their values affect, what they term, ‘Mediating Factors’ – 
essentially how that leader operates and the decisions they make for an organization. 




14 Thomas, Jeffrey L. 1999. "Personality and Motivational Predictors of Military Leadership Assessment in 




Their work seems to be supported by another study the author pair did together on school 
principals and their impact on school operations. They extrapolate the impact of that 
study to business executives and demonstrate similar effects15. The salient conclusion of 
this study is that an organization does begin to “…reflect the personality of their 
leaders16.”   
   In their study for the Global Business and Management Research journal, Saad, 
Sudin, and Shamsuddin of Malaysia concluded via quantitative methods using several 
tests – including the NEO-PI-R and the Five Factor Method – that, 
[Leadership] styles, personality attributes and employee communication 
are significantly correlated to employee engagement. [Leadership]…personality 
attributes… and employee communication… have positive association with 
employee engagement. This study also found that personality attributes affects 
more than employee communication and leadership styles. Furthermore, this 
study found that the higher positions of the employees are more engaged than the 
lower position employees17. 
 
Like many of the other studies done on leader personalities, they followed similar 
methods and it does make their study fairly derivative as far as their conclusions; 
however, the unique aspect of their study is the application of the leaders’ personalities 
and leadership styles and the impact on the workforce. 
 
15 Oreg, Shaul and Yair Berson. 2018. "The Impact of Top Leaders’ Personalities: The Processes through 
which Organizations Become Reflections of their Leaders." Current Directions in Psychological 
Science 27 (4): 241-248. 
doi:10.1177/0963721417748397. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0963721417748397. 
 
16 Oreg, Shaul and Yair Berson. 2018. "The Impact of Top Leaders’ Personalities: The Processes through 
which Organizations Become Reflections of their Leaders." Current Directions in Psychological 
Science 27 (4): 241-248. 
doi:10.1177/0963721417748397. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0963721417748397. 
17 Saad, Zuliawati Mohamed, Sudin Suhaimi, and Norlina Shamsuddin. 2018. "The Influence of Leadership 
Style, Personality Attributes and Employee Communication on Employee Engagement." Global Business 




 As far as relating business to the world of the military, Akansu, Cicon, Ferris, and 
Sun demonstrate a potential silver lining to the ill-tempered executive. Just as Pennington 
et al. mention that a leader may be sour at times because of stress, Akansu et al. attempt 
to explain a cause behind that:  
Specifically, if a CEO shows disgust or anger during a media interview, 
we show a subsequent increase in the firm’s profit margin, sales growth, and 
return on assets. This happens because CEOs who are in negative moods are more 
likely to engage in detail oriented and substantive decision making processes to 
improve their situations (Mackie and Worth [1991], Schwarz and Bless [1991])18. 
 
The connection here is the reasoning that if a CEO who is focusing more heavily on 
detail-oriented decision is likely to show disgust or anger in an interview, it is possible 
the same pattern applies to Generals. A General who snaps at one of his subordinates for 
reasons other than discipline may very well be spending a great deal of time and effort on 
tactical and minute strategical decisions, thereby causing great amounts of stress. 
  
Literature Summary 
There is a significant amount of literature on personality trait examinations of 
military leaders, but the majority of it focuses on personal growth and fostering 
leadership traits in junior officers. Rarely does the literature discuss the conduct of GOs, 
let alone the discourse between commanding officers. In an attempt to fill that gap, this 
study utilized literature from the business industry that discusses conduct and 
communications from CEOs; CEOs function at a roughly equivalent organizational 
 
18 Akansu, Ali, James Cicon, Stephen P. Ferris, and Yanjia Sun. 2017. "Firm Performance in the Face of 






echelon as GOs and, after examination, could be extrapolated to application for GO 
conduct. Further research is required specifically into the conduct and command relations 
of GOs in order to better facilitate a discussion of how GOs interact impacts operations. 
 
RESEARCH QUESTION 
 The main purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between GOs 
personalities, interpersonal relations with their superior and subordinate commanders, 
and the impacts of those on operations. This study poses the following research question: 
to what extent do military leaders’ personalities and command relations affect 
strategy and operations? The expected result of the study is that the personalities and 
schema of individual commanders do impact their ability to accept external strategic 
suggestions or strategies from other commanders.  
The hypothesis for this case study: Eisenhower became target fixated on ball-
bearing factories and similar targets for the CBO and, as a result, ignored Spaatz’s urging 
to focus the air campaign against the German oil industry. In this case study, the expected 
result is to see that Eisenhower, indeed, became target fixated and ignored Spaatz 
because it did not fit within his own agenda; Eisenhower allowed a personal bias to create 
a conflict between himself and one of his subordinate commanders.  
The reason this was chosen as an exemplar is because of its prominence. World 
War II is arguably one of the last times Generals were so deeply involved in tactical 
decisions to the degree that the Allied commanders were. In that sense, the tension that 
the high stakes of the CBO created added on top of the stressors on General Eisenhower 
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to balance the air forces with the land and sea forces lends itself to a situation ripe for 
potentially poor communications and fairly immediate impact on tactical operations. 
 For the sake of falsifiability, there are multiple possible null hypotheses. It is 
possible that 1) Eisenhower was receiving direction from the Allied political leaders (i.e. 
President Roosevelt, the U.S. War Department, Prime Minister Churchill, etc.) to focus 
on the production of mechanical components; 2) although Spaatz’s strategy was effective 
after D-Day, Eisenhower possessed intelligence or analysis that Spaatz was not privy to 
that made targeting oil inefficient. Another explanation could be outside of their 
command relationship altogether: 3) the sheer factor of feasibility. Meaning that if the 
Allies did not possess the means to strike the oil industry effectively, it would not prove a 
viable strategy. 
 There is also a known and accepted intrinsic bias to this study as it is focused 
primarily within the construct of the U.S. military, as it pertains to the exemplar and 
extrapolated discussion. It would prove a benefit for further study to apply the findings of 
this study to other militaries to determine viability of more global application. 
  
 Method 
The method used to conduct the study is primarily a single-case qualitative case 
study applied to an historical exemplar of the relationship between Generals Eisenhower 
and Spaatz during the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO) for the purpose of initial 
development of theory for GO professional interpersonal conduct. The framework 
established by fusing literature from the various fields above takes into account the lack 
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of academic conversation on the communications of military commanders amongst 
themselves and the lack of academic literature defining proper conduct for GOs.  
While individual personalities are not the primary focus of this study, they do 
factor in to individual approaches to interpersonal and command decisions made directly 
relating to strategy and tactical choices. Utilizing the concepts laid forth in the literature 
of conduct of military officers and CEOs, this study will examine the interactions of 
Generals Eisenhower and Spaatz to discover if any interpersonal conflicts hindered 
strategic development. 
This study was built around a basic process-tracing in order to develop a theory 
for the research question. The main goal for this case study is to discover the causal 
mechanisms behind why Eisenhower refused to enact Spaatz’s oil plan until June 1944. 
Elaborating on the hypothesis, the test is to determine if personal biases prevented the 
implementation of an effective strategy.  
 
Sources 
 This study, being focused on an historical event, the sources for the study will be 
historical in nature. Primary sources are the most preferable and will be utilized when 
able; however, during research it was discovered that many written communications 
between the Generals are still classified and therefore unavailable for unclassified 
publication. The primary sources that are available are published reports from the U.S. 
Army Air Force (USAAF)/ U.S. Air Force (USAF).  Secondary sources are a large 
portion of the data collected to recount the events of the command decisions of the CBO. 
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While not the most ideal, under the aforementioned conditions with classification 
concerns, the use of secondary sources will suffice.  
As a note for further study: once the written communications are declassified, it 
would be prudent to examine them and add to this study’s analysis in the case that any 
conclusions may change. 
 
DATA 
 The Beginning of the CBO 
1943 was a major crescendo in the Allied war effort: that year included the height 
of the air war for both the Allied and Axis, Allied preparation for an invasion of the 
European mainland, and massive changes in battlefield technologies. For the Allies, the 
air war in Europe focused heavily on strategic bombing as an attempt to hamstring the 
German war production effort. This manifested itself in two very different strategies 
between the American and British forces: the Americans, with the Eighth Air Force (8 
AF) and Fifteenth Air Force (15 AF), preferred daylight precision bombing and the 
British Bomber Command preferred nighttime area bombing. Allied leaders were able to 
leverage these preferences to create a round-the-clock bombing schedule – this was the 
foundation of the Combined Bomber Offensive. 
The British philosophy revolved around area bombing to break the will of the 
people. Their concept was to drop massive numbers of large munitions across city-wide 
areas to cause damage to both military and civilian infrastructure. By doing so, 
supposedly materials and time would be pulled away from frontline production to 
rebuilding – thereby causing a production deficit. The American concept, on the other 
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hand, believed that targeting specific industries or production facilities would create a 
shortage of critical materials. Russell points out the disparity between American and 
British schools of thought: 
Maj. Gen. Carl A. Spaatz, commander of the Eighth Air Force, and Brig. 
Gen. Ira C. Eaker… disagreed vehemently with the British. They argued that the 
only way to achieve air superiority over Europe was to force the Luftwaffe to 
fight in the daytime. After the Luftwaffe had been defeated, the heavy bombers 
could cripple the enemy by destroying the electrical power network, petroleum 
industry, and other strategic targets listed…19 
 
Unfortunately, during 1943, the CBO was not as successful as hoped. 
Theoretically, the targeting of ball bearing factories, one of the initial priority targets, 
should have played into slowing or halting production of a wide variety of war machines 
from ranging from tanks to aircraft and many other machines. However, Germany proved 
it was able to easily recover from factory losses. 
Another point of failure for the CBO was the massive attrition rates for Allied 
aircrews. Associated with the bomber attrition rates was a distinct lack of fighter escort 
coverage. Without proper fighter escort, the bombers – despite being armed with multiple 
gunner positions – were virtually helpless against the agile, well-armed German fighter 
aircraft. Since the nature of the CBO put Allied aircrews deep within enemy airspace, 
bombers were, more often than not, forced to operate unescorted to their target area. 
Without long-range fighters, the Allies attempted a phased approach to coverage that 
largely failed. On top of that, when the fighters were actually escorting bomber 
formations, the fighter pilots were forced to stay beside the bombers until they were 
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engaged by the enemy; there was no allowance for proactive actions to take the fight to 
the Luftwaffe whenever able at this point in the war. CBO operations continued in this 
manner until the late spring of 194420. 
 
General Dwight D. Eisenhower 
 Of Eisenhower’s character, he once said “I know only one method of 
operation…To be as honest with others as I am with myself21.” Accounts of 
Eisenhower’s actions and character from both Ambrose and the diary of Captain Butcher 
seem to reflect this. This does not mean, however, that he was meek. Eisenhower 
demonstrated great resolve as a commander in dealing with the various sources of stress 
and pressure to execute an elaborate grand strategy. Not only was Eisenhower 
responsible to push out orders to his subordinate Generals, he also answered to the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and “…was still responsible to the CCS [Combined Chiefs of Staff] 
and, beyond that body, to Churchill and Roosevelt22.”  
One factor that stands out is that an American General is answerable to the British 
as well as his American leadership.   “[A] principal source of criticism [of Eisenhower] 
…is the British. One of Eisenhower’s difficult tasks was to arbitrate between the 
imperious demands of the Field Marshall Montgomery and the necessities of his own 
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American field commanders23.” On top of Montgomery, Eisenhower also had to balance 
the application of air power between his American commanders (like Spaatz, Eaker, 
Doolittle, and Arnold) and the British commanders of the RAF like Air Chief Marshall 
(ACM) Tedder and Leigh-Mallory, which was no small feat in itself. Captain Butcher 
wrote in his diary on 03 March 1944, “Just when Ike thinks he has the problem of air 
command licked, as he put it today, “someone else’s feelings are hurt and I have another 
problem to settle.”24” 
 
General Carl A. Spaatz 
General Carl Spaatz worked closely with Eisenhower during the war as Spaatz 
commanded the Mediterranean Air Forces and later was commander of the Supreme 
Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHEAF); he “…possessed a good measure of 
the fourth necessary ingredient of a successful general--the ability to inspire trust in both 
superiors and [subordinates,]” and he “also earned Eisenhower's esteem25.”   
From June 1942 through May 1945, the two worked hand in hand, 
becoming close friends… However, the friendship did not interfere with 
Eisenhower's judgment. In June 1943, he wrote of Spaatz, "I have an impression 
he is not tough and hard enough personally to meet the full requirements of his 
high position."26”  
Two years later, however, Eisenhower claimed, 
  
"[No] one could tell him that Spaatz was not the best operational air man 
in the world, [although] he was not a paper man, couldn't write what he wanted, 
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and couldn't conduct himself at a conference, but he had the utmost respect from 
everybody, ground and air, in the theater27. " 
 
General Ira Eaker, in an article for the Air Force Magazine, wrote a piece on 
General Spaatz. In it he described a conversation between Spaatz and Eisenhower that 
helps paint a picture of their relationship.  
“Early in the campaign, Eisenhower called Spaatz to a fateful conference. 
He said, “Tooey, my morning report shows you have 400 planes, while the British 
have 300 and the French show 100. Rommel has only 500 planes by today’s 
intelligence estimate, yet every day he clobbers us. How come?” 
            Spaatz said, “Ike, your figures are about right. When they hit me they 
outnumber me five to four; when they hit the British, they have the advantage five 
to three. The Germans have overwhelming superiority over the French, five to 
one. Our tactics have been all wrong. The airplane is a poor defensive weapon. 
Airpower must always be used on the offensive. The first mission of the tactical 
air force is to win air superiority over the battlefield. Only then can it be diverted 
to secondary roles like observation, directing artillery fire, shooting up tanks, or 
defending headquarters. 
Eisenhower said, “Tooey, I get the point. Hereafter, as long as I am in 
command, you have operational control of all the airplanes made available to me 
by our government or any Allied nation.”28 
 
What this helps illustrate is the manner of the working relationship between Eisenhower 
and Spaatz. In this conversation, Eisenhower displays trust in the judgement of Spaatz’s 
assessment of the air war and use of air power and gives Spaatz authority over the air 
forces. There is no enmity nor personality conflict present and, as such, demonstrates a 
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General Spaatz urged General Eisenhower to attack the German oil industry in 
late 1943 and 194429. “[General Spaatz’s] feelings were supported by information derived 
from Ultra intelligence, indicating that the Germans were indeed beginning to suffer 
critical shortages30.” The Ultra program was used to decrypt the German Enigma code 
and resulted in valuable, timely intelligence to Allied commanders. General Spaatz 
submitted a plan to bomb synthetic oil plants; he claimed that the Germans would use the 
Luftwaffe for defense – that would only accelerate the destruction of German planes and 
oil. 31  
In comparing the effect of oil vs. transportation, Spaatz insists the weight 
of attack required to deal with a large marshaling yard is about the same as that 
required for a synthetic-oil plant and the target areas are relatively the same size. 
Furthermore, only fourteen synthetic oil plants produce eighty percent of all 
German synthetic gasoline and oil, whereas fourteen marshaling yards comprise 
only a fraction of the German railway system[.]32” 
 
In fact, Spaatz was not the only commander to submit a Course of Action (COA) 
to Eisenhower; Richard Davis notes that Air Chief Marshal (ACM) Trafford Leigh-
Mallory and ACM Tedder together submitted a transportation plan that proposed the 
targeting of railyards to limit the movement of German support. This transportation plan 
was vigorously opposed by Spaatz, whom said that the assault on railways could 
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“…reduce by thirty per cent the present efficiency of the enemy railroads, which was 
hardly sufficient33.” 
Bogardus states that, “Eisenhower chose the transportation plan on 25 March 
because it offered measurable results; the effects of the oil plan, although logical, could 
not be verified with existing Allied intelligence34.” Those measurable results really 
translated into the effect on the landing for Operation OVERLORD. Eisenhower believed 
that any positive effects on the oil industry would still take too long to fully reach the 
beachhead to limit the capabilities of the defenses along the Atlantic Wall35.  
To that claim, there is contradictory evidence: Captain Butcher – who was an 
executive officer to Eisenhower from 1942-1945 – notes in his diary that Eisenhower 
decided on the transportation plan on 30 March 1944 and that Spaatz’ oil plan was 
assessed to take around six months before it would “…seriously affect German military 
operations.”36 For the reason of a primary source as opposed to a secondary source, the 
timeline – although similar – and assessment of the oil plan from Butcher’s account takes 
precedence. 
Not to mention, there was already a standing air strategy that was published 
before Pearl Harbor, “…designated AWPD–1, for an aerial offensive against Germany. 
 
33 Ambrose, Stephen E. 1970. The Supreme Commander; the War Years of General Dwight D. Eisenhower. 
Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday., 372 
 
34 Davis, Richard G. 1997. "Gen Carl Spaatz and D Day." Airpower Journal 11 (4): 
20. https://search.proquest.com/docview/217803355. 
 




36 Butcher, Harry C. 1901. 1946. My Three Years with Eisenhower; the Personal Diary of Captain Harry C. 




Prepared by the Air War Plans Division in July 1941 at the request of President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt, the plan’s first priority was to attain air superiority by destroying the 
German aircraft industry and operational fighters. The second priority was to destroy the 
German electrical power grid, transportation network, and oil industry37.” By definition, 
assaulting the oil industry is the last place in the list. 
Not accepting the reluctance to target oil, on 18 May 1943, Gen Spaatz ordered 
the 15 AF to assault the marshalling yards at Ploesti knowing full well that the bombs 
would hit the oil refineries surrounding the yards. One year later – refusing to accept 
Eisenhower’s decision – on 05 May 1944, the 15 AF once again struck Ploesti – both of 
these were done before formal announcement of oil as a priority target.38 Davis also tells 
of some tensions that came out of the strike on Ploesti: 
Spaatz went to Eisenhower that evening and found the supreme 
commander upset with the AAF. First, in spite of the decision of 25 March in 
favor of transportation, the Eighth had yet to bomb a single transportation target, 
with the invasion only seven weeks distant.39 
 
Spaatz’s decisions were swiftly vindicated by the German response and the Enigma 
messages that were intercepted after the attack on Ploesti; defensive resources were 
hurriedly transferred to protect the synthetic oil plants40. 
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After borderline insubordinate operations, D-Day, and continued pressure from Spaatz, 
on 08 June 1944 the order was given to make German oil the priority target of the CBO. 
Once the 8 AF and 15 AF, predominantly the 15 AF, shifted focus to targeting German 
oil facilities, there was a clear restriction in German ability to field resources. (For more 
details on why Spaatz pressed this idea see “APPENDIX A: Why Target German Oil and 
Power?”) 
 
Limiting External Factors to Targeting Oil and Power Before 1944 
 Strategic Assessment of Spaatz’s Oil Plan 
 When examining the causes for not targeting German oil until mid-1944, there are 
more than just personality disputes, but command decisions are a major factor. On the 
American side, General Eisenhower decided to pursue the transportation plan submitted 
by the British on 30 March 1944; it was chosen “…because the oil plan [would] not 
seriously affect German military operations for six months, too long for immediate 
benefit to OVERLORD41. What Eisenhower did not anticipate was the German ability to 
rebuild and repurpose their infrastructure. Roads and railways were rebuilt almost 
immediately to resume shipping of goods; if a factory was leveled, not only would it be 
rebuilt in weeks or even days, but in the meantime it was relatively simple for another 
factory to change what they produce to make up for the loss of a ball bearing facility – 
thereby still meeting production requirements. General Spaatz attempted to have oil 
moved up as a top priority of the CBO in March 1944, but Eisenhower denied his 
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request42, demonstrating that, “Those segments of the Allied apparatus that did approach 
an accurate understanding were obstructed in translating it into an effective policy43. 
 Analysts for the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) 
found some holes in Spaatz’s plan, however. In a history written by David Eisenhower – 
the General’s grandson – he claims that targets that were south and southeast of Berlin 
were too dangerous to strike and, moreover, “…several of the primary targets listed were 
synthetic oil plants in the Ruhr, by-passed earlier because of smoke, haze, heavy ground-
based anti-aircraft fire and other problems not solved by the P-47 and P-5144.”  
 
The RAF and ACM Leigh-Mallory 
 From the British side, the Royal Air Force (RAF) refused to abandon the idea of 
area bombing. The RAF did break from area bombing for a short time to aid the 
American daylight bombings by targeting the oil refineries in the Ruhr region, but the 
British Bomber Command did not switch away from area bombing in total in favor of 
precision bombing.  
 ACM Leigh-Mallory, whom Spaatz was staunchly opposed to, was a source of 
frustration for Spaatz and his oil plan. Unfortunately for Spaatz, Leigh-Mallory was 
described in Davis’ book as such: 
 “[A] man of driving egoism,” with a habitually haughty manner and “an 
assertive temperament.” Even his apologists admit that he “was so typically 
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English, [and] sometimes tactless, almost pompous in appearance and naïve in 
character without any finesse…45” 
 
He and Spaatz were almost diametrically opposed to one another – evident by their 
personalities – and that made their command relationship very difficult and even acrid46. 
Davis even reports part of an entry of Spaatz’s diary: “Am not sure whether L-M [Leigh-
Mallory] has proper conception of air role47.” 
  
Technological Limitation 
 In conjunction with the British reservations against precision bombing is an issue 
of technology. From the account of ACM Arthur Harris, a British air commander, he 
notes that the economic targeteers overlooked the fact that it was not until 1944 that 
sufficient navigational aids existed to facilitate accurate enough night bombing of 
specific targets. “An important factor, which the economic experts never grasped, was 
that it was only in the closing stages of the war that we had navigational aids such as 
would enable us to identify and hit isolated targets as small as the average large factory48. 
A major limiting factor was the lack of sufficient fight escort for the Allied 
bomber formations. Prior to the late spring of 1944, fighter cover for bomber formations 
was attempted in phases from England to the border of Germany. From the German 
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border to the target area, the bombers had to fly defenseless. Often, though, the bombers 
would fly unescorted because the fighter ‘relay’ was inherently flawed. Without modern 
communication systems the fighters struggled to meet up with the bombers – the fighter 
squadrons could have taken off too early or late, or accidentally ended up a few miles in 
the wrong direction – causing the bomber formations to fly through occupied Europe 
airspace without fighter cover. The ultimate fix to this issue was the P-51D: with its Rolls 
Royce Merlin engine, additional on-board fuel tank behind the cockpit, and two extra 
drop tanks it was able to fly at the same altitude as the bombers and had the range to 
escort the formations all the way from England to Berlin and back. Unfortunately, the P-
51D did not see widespread dissemination to the various Fighter Squadrons (FSs) and 





CBO’s Effect on German Oil and Power from June 1944 
 The combat chronology of the Army Air Forces during World War II provides 
significant insight into how many missions were conducted by each Numbered Air Force 
(NAF) on particular days. The following is a sample of some of the sorties conducted 
against German oil targets: 08 June 1944: Gen Spaatz announces oil is now the top 
priority for the CBO. Strikes on oil targets, predominantly by the 15 AF, occurred on 09, 
10, 11, 14 June49, demonstrating the clear ability of the Allies to leverage their bomber 
forces against the oil targets.  
Once the CBO shifted its focus to bombing the German oil industry, there was a 
distinct drop in production and severe impact on the German ability to field aircraft and 
other ground vehicles. Table 41 from the Strategic Bombing Survey (Figure 3) details the 
production drop over the course of 1944-4550. There is a clear trend towards decreased 
levels of production across the board as time progressed from 1944; however, most 
notably is the column showing the production of hydrogenation and Fischer-Tropsch oil. 
Production remained fairly consistent until June 1944 – when General Spaatz finally 
made the formal declaration that German oil would be a prime target for the CBO – when 
production drops off significantly. Milward also has tables that demonstrate the drop in 
production: From April to July 1944, production of aviation fuel dropped from 175,000 
tons to only 29,000 tons – an 84.5% drop. In July 1944, the daily production from 17-25 
July dropped from 2,307 tons to the lowest point, on 21 July, of just 120 tons only to 
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equalize at 417 tons – end to end a decrease of 82%.51 These numbers demonstrate the 
vicious effect targeting the German oil industry had on German capacity and reserves. 
“According to a decrypted Luftwaffe message of 5 June 1944, fuel supplies had become 
so low that the air arm had to tap its strategic reserve and that it had made fuel available 
only for training; bomber, fighter, and ground attack; and some transport flights52. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 The Generals 
Much of the data for this study came from the operations of the CBO, but there 
are salient moments that highlight the interactions and command relationship of 
Eisenhower and Spaatz. More importantly, the operational data serves as a measure for 
the impact of the relationship between the two Generals. As discussed in the Literature 
Review, much of the discussion in the military is about the fostering of personal 
leadership skills for junior officers. Examining the pressure Spaatz put on his superior 
commander, who happened to be a five-star General, there is a demonstrable propensity 
towards open and forward communication between the two men. Both GOs demonstrated 
a clear understanding of communication and command decisiveness; both were direct, yet 
frank in their communications and, consequently, built a close working relationship. 
When Spaatz disagreed with the decision of Eisenhower to focus on 
transportation, he took matters into his own hands and altered operations to fit his own 
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agenda. While this was borderline insubordinate (it was not only due to semantics and 
what his ‘official’ target was at Ploesti being the ‘marshaling yards’), he turned out to be 
correct in his assessment, but he was certainly willing to take a major risk to prove it. 
This does not so much play into the direct interactions of GOs, but it is a result of a 
disagreement of one party on a strategic decision; this drastic shift in operations is 
certainly related to the diagram from Oreg and Berson where Spaatz’s Values lead to 
Strategic Decisions and ultimate changed the vector of operations. 
Eisenhower, on the other hand, was operating at an even higher level than Spaatz. 
He had to concern himself with not only the Air Component, but with the operations on 
land and sea as well. Eisenhower had oversight on all Allied operations in Europe and it 
is clear that he did not necessarily become target fixated on transportation and ball 




The most prominent external factor to the delay in targeting German oil was 
actually a legitimate assessment of Spaatz’s plan. Butcher annotates part of the 
conversation of the commanders regarding the oil and transportation plans. 
[ACM Tedder] states that no one can question that the oil plan, in view of 
the proved ability of the U.S. Strategic Air Force to carry our precision attacks 
deep in Germany, would ultimately have grave effects on the German war effort. 
It is difficult, however, to see evidence to support the view that it could be 
expected to take real effect in time for OVERLORD…53 
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The salient detail here is that none of the commanders doubted that the oil plan would 
work. The deciding factor for Eisenhower was the timeline. This decision was made in 
March 1944 – only three months before the largest amphibious assault in history. The oil 
plan was assessed to not produce significant impact to German operations for six months. 
That would put the return on investment of combat resources to three months after the 
invasion. Eisenhower’s concern was to provide every possible advantage to the invasion 
force to help them establish a foothold on the beaches of Normandy. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 After examining the conduct of Generals Eisenhower and Spaatz integrated with 
the operational events, the evidence provides some insight into an answer for the research 
question. There are multiple outcomes from the study.  
 Conclusion 1: The Research Question 
This case study does demonstrate that GOs personalities and command relations 
can significantly affect strategy development, however, it must not be a main variable. 
Through examination of the conduct and impact of Generals Eisenhower and Spaatz 
during the CBO, these men demonstrated clearly that by remaining open to suggestions, 
GOs can communicate effectively and, as a result, serves to confirm findings from within 
the field of business leadership that leaders’ personalities do impact strategy development 
and operations. 
Both commanders demonstrated principles of communication and leadership that 
are also prevalent in the existing military leadership literature. This does imply that even 
the decades-old sources are still somewhat relevant. Yet, there is still a blatant lack of a 
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modern discussion and picture of conduct for GOs in the realm of academia. The 
inclusion of the discussion within the school of business regarding the conduct and 
communications of CEOs does help bridge that gap but does not fulfill it. 
Ultimately, the conclusion for the research question is that while leaders’ 
personalities and command relations are able to impact strategy development, they are 
not a sole driving factor in strategy development. However, this conclusion is from just 
this single-case case study; it does, however, serve to initiate academic discussion 
regarding how GOs conduct themselves professionally. 
 
Conclusion 2: The Case Study Hypothesis 
The example of Eisenhower and Spaatz, their professional relationship was 
demonstrably positive and therefore proves the null hypotheses that there were other 
factors that contributed to the delayed implementation of Spaatz’s oil plan. Both men 
were good friends and yet did not allow that friendship to interfere with command 
decision-making processes (i.e. giving Spaatz’s plan preferential treatment because of 
friendship). Eisenhower, as the SHEAF Commander, therefore, was able to weigh the 
strategic needs of his American commanders alongside the needs of the British 
commanders to help ensure the most economic use of combat forces. 
While Spaatz’s oil plan was generally accepted as an effective strategy, it was not 
initially dismissed due to a personality conflict, but rather for legitimate assessment of 
strategy and timeline. The one major factor for delaying Spaatz’s oil plan was the 
demand placed on Eisenhower to ensure as great a benefit to the invasion force for 
Operation OVERLORD as possible. It was determined by a team of analysts that 
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Spaatz’s plan would not provide as much benefit to the invasion force in time for D-Day. 
As OVERLORD was the prime objective, Eisenhower chose the plan that would provide 
the greatest benefit to that goal. Once the beachhead at Normandy was established, 
Eisenhower allowed Spaatz to take the fight to the German oil industry. 
  
Conclusion 3 and Further Research  
Intriguingly, a personality conflict does not arise between Spaatz and Eisenhower, 
but rather between Spaatz and ACM Leigh-Mallory – an Allied partner nation 
commander. This finding brings up a proposal for further research: this study focused 
predominately on the relationship of a superior and subordinate commander, but the next 
stage of research should focus on equivalent-level commanders and the relationship of 

















APPENDIX A: Why Target German Oil and Power? 
It would be prudent to understand the reasons behind why Spaatz so vehemently 
supported a plan to target the German oil industry; a main reason to target the German oil 
and power industries was the reliance of German industry on fuel and power. While it 
proved futile to demolish factories that were building war machines, if there was no gas 
for the planes, tanks, and other vehicles, they could not operate. An important factor to 
this idea of targeting oil is to understand that Germany was not rich in crude oil and 
therefore had to import almost all of its crude oil – making oil very costly and resulting in 
no real stockpiles or domestic sources of oil even before a wartime environment54. 
Because Germany lacked any sizable source of crude oil, it imported the majority of its 
crude oil from fields in Romania55. McArthur points out that, “Only 23% of the oil 
produced in Germany itself was crude oil56.” By extrapolation, 77% of German oil was 
synthetic. This condition also led the Germans to charge forward with synthetic oil 
production from coal, of which Germany had in relative abundance. 
The Germans had two potential processes in order to produce synthetic oil: the 
Fischer-Tropsch method and hydrogenation. Most pertinent to the CBO and its efforts to 
cripple the Luftwaffe, hydrogenation plants should have been the greatest focus. Major 
hydrogenation plants were located at “…Leuna, Bohlen, and Gelsenberg… Magdeburg, 
Lutzkendorf, Zeitz… and Politz57.” Table 38, from the United States Strategic Bombing 
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Survey (Figure 2b), shows that in the first quarter of 1944, hydrogenation was 
responsible for producing 503 metric tons of aviation fuel58. The implication of this 
number lies with the “Total from all sources” block: 546 metric tons. This means that 
hydrogenation was responsible for 92.12% of all German aviation fuel. The Survey goes 
on to state, “Requirements were estimated by the Luftwaffe during early 1943 at 250,000 
tons per month, and this appears to be a reasonable figure in the light of earlier 
consumption. With no prospect of obtaining this amount, requirements were reduced in 




58 United States Strategic Bombing Survey. 1945. The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German War 
Economy. Its Reports. European War. 3. Washington: Over-all Economic Effects Division., 76 
59 United States Strategic Bombing Survey. 1945. The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German War 




What this suggests is that even by 1943 the Luftwaffe understood that its fuel demands 
were unsustainable, and rationing was necessary. This fact alone should have been a 
bigger factor in making oil refineries and facilities a strategic target.  
 Hydrogenation produced predominately aviation fuel; the other method, the 
Fischer-Tropsch process, was instrumental in providing synthetic diesel and other fuel. 
Therefore, it would have been foolish to not target both methods of synthetic oil 
production. While a major focus area of the CBO was to cripple the Luftwaffe, the intent 
was to curtail the German ability to field battlefield resources and machines. The only 
thing Fischer-Tropsch oil needed was an additive of benzene60 to create lower-grade, but 
still very functional, diesel. This oil was also used in other production processes like 
rubber61.  Harris speaks to the British economic analysts whom referred to synthetic oil 
plants as “Pangaea” targets:  
Ever since the beginning of the war these had been the favourite targets of 
the Ministry of Economic Warfare. They were, indeed, the most important and 
most persistently recommended of a whole class of objectives which at Bomber 
Command we always called "panacea" targets. These were targets which were 
supposed by the economic experts to be such a vital bottleneck in the German war 
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